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ABSTRACT
Injection attacks, including SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and operating system command
injection, rank the top two entries in the MITRE Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) [1].
Under this attack model, an application (e.g., a web application) uses some untrusted input to
produce an output program (e.g., a SQL query). Applications may be vulnerable to injection
attacks because the untrusted input may alter the output program in malicious ways. Recent work
has established a rigorous definition of injection attacks. Injections are benign iff they obey the
NIE property, which states that injected symbols strictly insert or expand noncode tokens in the
output program. Noncode symbols are strictly those that are either removed by the tokenizer (e.g.,
insignificant whitespace) or span closed values in the output program language, and code symbols
are all other symbols. This thesis demonstrates that such attacks are possible on applications for
Android—a mobile device operating system—and Bash—a common Linux shell—and shows by
construction that these attacks can be detected precisely. Specifically, this thesis examines the
recent Shellshock attacks on Bash and shows how it widely differs from ordinary attacks, but can
still be precisely detected by instrumenting the output program’s runtime. The paper closes with a
discussion of the lessons learned from this study and how best to overcome the practical challenges
to precisely preventing these attacks in practice.
iii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Injection attacks, including SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and operating system command
injection, rank the top two most commonly reported vulnerabilities in the MITRE Common Vul-
nerability Enumeration (CVE) [1]. Injection vulnerabilities can often occur in web applications
using a relational database for persistent storage of user credentials, user information, transaction
records, etc. Typically, the application’s interface to that database is the Structured Query Lan-
guage (SQL) [2]. Consider such an applcation that takes a user’s username and password from a
web form and executes the following SQL query.
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user=‘cw’ AND pw=‘banana’
The injected input from the web form is underlined. The authentication is successful iff a
row is returned from the database, in which case that row includes the user’s real name and other
personal information for use during that session. The injected symbols in this case simply caused the
string literals (both originally ‘’) to be expanded to include the data from the form. Since a string
performs no operations by itself—i.e., it is dynamically passive—the first output program is benign.
However, output programs contain both code (instructions) and noncode (passive parameters to
those instructions); the input fed into the web form may be maliciously formed to exploit this
situation.
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user=‘’ OR 1=1--’ AND pw=‘’
The -- symbols start a comment in the output program, causing the rest of the symbols to
be ignored. The result is that the database returns all rows in the USERS table where either the
username is empty or 1=1. Since 1=1 is a tautology, all rows are returned and attacker subverts the
authentication mechanism. This is a code-injection attack (in this case known as SQL injection [1])
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because the attacker injected code to change the query. When the output language is an operating
system shell or similar external program, this is known as OS Command Injection [1].
The victim of such an attack need not be a web service. Browsers today typically support
Javascript, as opposed to purely rendering HTML. Without proper validation, an attacker might
register an account on this website with the name <script>alert(’injected’)</script>. Con-
sider a web-based administration console for the website where each user’s information can be
viewed and edited. The administrator views the details of such an attacker using a browser. Since
the name field forms an HTML script element, the browser could execute the script upon rendering
the page, potentially with the same permissions as an administrator. While an alert window is
relatively benign, the script could include web requests to compromise the website entirely (e.g.
to wipe the database or create an administrator account for the attacker) or code to attack the
victim’s computer directly. This form of injection attack is known as cross-site scripting (XSS) [1].
Injected symbols may be malicious without being code. Consider the following slice of a web
application [3].
$data = ‘\‘; securityCheck(); $data .= ’&f=exit#’;\n f();
The application intends to assign untrusted input to the variable data, perform a security check,
concatenate another string to $data, and call the f function. The injected backslash character \
is a valid string literal. However, in some languages during lexical analysis a backslash character
may be used to escape the next symbol—i.e., force the next symbol to be considered noncode. The
single quote following the backlash is escaped, so some of the code following the string became part
of the string literal; the resulting program can be approximately represented as follows.
$data = ‘.....’&f=exit#’;\n f();.
That is, only noncode was injected, but the injection caused tokens to be removed. The resulting
program assigns the string (with braces as delimiters for clarity) {’; securityCheck(); $data
.= } to $data, binds the function reference f to the exit function, and calls f, thereby calling
exit and causing a denial of service. Since only noncode was injected, but the injected symbols
maliciously changed the output program, this is an instance of a noncode-injection attack.
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The disclosure of the Shellshock vulnerability in Bash operating system shell was one of the
biggest security reports of the past year. Thousands of attacks exploiting the vulnerability were
reported within hours of disclosure [4, 5]. US-CERT/NIST rated the severity of all six Shellshock
vulnerabilities it announced as a 10.0 out of 10 [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11], justified by the arbitrary code
execution capability it provided to attackers. Soon after the initial disclosure, new vulnerabilities
continued to be disclosed, and patches to fix them sometimes negated previous fixes or even intro-
duced new vulnerabilities themselves [12, 13, 14, 15]. This story adds to the pile of evidence that
the hack-patch cycle fails to produce secure software. For example, similar vulnerabilities could
exist in Bash, either undiscovered or undisclosed; we have no way to guarantee that such attacks
are prevented.
This thesis examines injection attacks in the context of the Android mobile device operating
system and the Shellshock vulnerability in Bash. While Shellshock may refer to the entire family of
vulnerabilities discovered after the initial disclosure, we specifically refer to the first and seemingly
most prevalent vulnerability. A study of the Android operating system and the top 50 free applica-
tions on the Google Play application market reveals that injection attacks are possible on Android
applications and such vulnerabilities are likely to exist in the wild. A study of Shellshock attacks
shows that Shellshock differs from typical injection attacks in that it is a higher-order attack, where
injected symbols start as noncode in the output program and only later become code [16]. Fur-
thermore, the manner in which the injected symbols may become code implies that Shellshock may
occur at any depth in a process tree rooted at the target application. A prototype implementation
instruments Java applications to precisely detect injection attacks, including Shellshock, for SQLite
(a SQL implementation available for Android applications) and a handwritten derivative of Bash.
1.1 Related Work
There have been many proposed solutions to defining (e.g., [3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]) and
detecting (e.g., [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]) code-injection attacks. Halfond et al. and
Nguyen-Tuong et al. consider malicious injections to be keywords and operator symbols (including
quotes for string literals) [19, 20]. SQLCheck requires injected symbols to form complete derivations
of nonterminals in the output program language [17]. CANDID detects attacks based by comparing
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Related Work False Positive False Negative
Halfond & Nguyen-Tuong et al. [19, 20] ...WHERE name=’Clayton’ ...WHERE id=exit()
SQLCheck [17] ...WHERE file=‘name.ext’ ...WHERE id=exit()
CANDID [18] ...WHERE flag=TRUE ...WHERE id=exit()
Figure 1.1: Examples of false positives and negatives in related work
syntactic structure of the output program and its intended representation, which is formed by
replacing injected symbols with ‘a’ or ‘1’ characters, depending on the injected symbol [18]. All of
these approaches exhibit false positives and false negatives, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Precisely
detecting injection attacks requires carefully defining code, injection, and attacks to address these
shortcomings.
Ray and Ligatti [3] define noncode as exactly the closed values in the output program language.
Therefore, injected symbols should strictly either be removed by the tokenizer (e.g., insignificant
whitespace) or cause noncode tokens to be inserted or expanded in the output program (the NIE
property). Injections that have broken this propery (BroNIEs) are attacks, capturing exactly the
set of code- and noncode-injection attacks. To my knowledge, Ray and Ligatti’s work [3] is the only
formal study of noncode-injection attacks. This definition, discussed further in Chapter 2, forms
the theoretical foundation for this thesis.
Ray and Ligatti prove that no static or black-box mechanism can precisely prevent injection
attacks; a dynamic, white-box mechanism is required [16]. In practice, programmers may elect
to use conservative mechanisms to prevent injection attacks. An example of such a mechanism
is a prepared statement, also known as a parameterized statement or parameterized query [32]. In
this scheme, output programs are created and parsed in advance, using placeholders for untrusted
input, and the input later fills the placeholders. Yet, as evidenced by the continued ubiquity of
these attacks, such mechanisms have failed to solve the problem as a whole. Several factors hinder
the scalability of prepared statements [3].
• They must be supported for all output languages. While this is standard for SQL lan-
guages [33, 34, 35, 36], we have yet to see such mechanisms for Bash scripts, for example.
• Programmers must elect to use prepared statements. Intuitively, blindly concatenating strings
together to form a query is much simpler than using prepared statements. A programmer
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faced with time pressures or ignorant of security issues may not elect or simply not know to
use such mechanisms.
• Converting an existing application to use prepared statements would require a rewriting, and
therefore re-testing of every piece of code that forms an output program. Such a decision
could be very expensive.
Injection attacks would therefore ideally be detected precisely and transparently to the program-
mer. Since untrusted inputs could propagate continuously as data dependencies, transparently pre-
venting such attacks would then require a taint tracking mechanism to label tainted (injected) data.
Taint tracking is well-studied and generally expensive to perform precisely (e.g., [30, 21, 19, 20, 37]).
Intuitively, changing an add operation on two registers to an add operation plus taint propagation
would result in substantial overhead without some assumptions on the width of the data or some
hardware assistance to encode a taint bit into the tracked data itself. Chin and Wagner [38]
show that by confining taint tracking to strings and modifying the underlying String class, a Java
application can be instrumented with little overhead.
The design and implementation of Android’s security model [39] is discussed in Chapter 3.1.
At a high-level, permissions requested at install time determine an application’s capabilities. To
enforce these permissions, Android assigns a unique Linux user id (uid) to each application and
associates each application’s permissions with its uid when authorization is performed at a low-level,
e.g. when interacting with the file system. A malicious application may abuse its capabilities, and
some research has studied the use of static analysis to detect malicious applications [40, 41]. Vidas
et al. discuss privilege escalation among other attacks on Android systems [42]. Users may actually
elect to use privilege escalation to circumvent security mechanisms on the existing operating system
and gain root access on their devices or install modified operating systems; typically, users do not
have such access. However, an attacker may use privilege escalation as well; multiple applications
with disjoint permissions may collaborate using inter-process communication to act with the union
of their permissions [43]. For example, an application with access to read contacts may send
contacts data to an application with permissions to send SMS messages or access the internet, and
that application may use that information to spam the user’s contacts or upload the data to the
attacker’s storage. Jin et al. examine injection attacks on HTML5-enabled mobile devices, showing
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that mobile devices have many unique channels in which such malicious injections may occur, such
as the camera, near-field communication, and Intent objects for inter-process communication on
Android [44].
1.2 Summary of Contributions and Roadmap
Chapter 2 begins with a formal review of injection attacks as defined by Ray and Ligatti [3].
With this theoretical basis established, Chapter 3 begins a study of real-world systems by examining
the Android mobile operating system, it’s software development kit, and a selection of popular
applications, showing that Android applications are just as susceptible to injection attacks as a
typical web application; it also examines injection attacks on operating system shells using Bash
and its recent Shellshock vulnerabilities as a case study. Chapter 4 formalizes a custom shell
language called Lash. Chapter 5 discusses a prototype implementation of Lash and mechanisms to
precisely detect injection attacks with Java as the application language and both SQLite and Lash
as output lanaguages. Chapter 6 discusses experiements performed to validate the implementations’
effectiveness and closes with lessons learned from this project.
I began this project with Grant Smith [45]. Together, we examined the Android system, SDK,
and applications. The ping drain and external storage wipe attacks discussed in Chapter 3.1,
majority of the survey of related work on Android security in Section 1.1, and original taint-
tracking mechanism are his contribution. The formal definition of injection attacks and language-
independent detection algorithm, discussed in Chapter 2 are attributed to Ray and Ligatti [3].
The revised taint-tracking mechanism discussed in Chapter 5 and remainder of this paper are my
contribution unless otherwise indicated.
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CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS: CODE, INJECTION, AND ATTACKS
Intuitively, an injection attack occurs exactly when an injected symbol maliciously alters an
output program. This chapter provides an overview of Ray and Ligatti’s formal definition of
injection attacks [3], which dictates the design and analysis of concrete systems as discussed in the
chapters that follow.
2.1 Defining Code
Intuitively, an output program’s instructions should already be provided by the application;
the injected input should simply affect the parameters to those instructions. For example, when
servicing a request to create an account for some new user, the injected user name should contain
strictly the user name and nothing more; an attacker should not be able to inject a function call,
even if it does return the user name, for it may cause malicious side-effects or never terminate.
This intuition leads us to define code by defining its complement: noncode is the set of pas-
sive terms in the output program language. In a typical programming language, this would mean
characters, strings, numbers, etc. that are all fully evaluated. However, even fully-evaluated ex-
pressions may still invoke dynamic behavior; variables are bound to values, but must be substituted
at runtime. Expressions are open when they contain free variables; otherwise, they are closed.
These definitions are formalized as follows [3]. Henceforth, let |p| denote the length of an output
program p, and p[i] denote the ith symbol in p.
Definition 1 (Free Variables [3]). For all languages L, function FV (p, l, h) over L×{1..|p|}×{l..|p|}
returns the set of free variables in the shortest term in p containing all symbols from l to h.
Definition 2 (Values [3]). For all languages L, predicate V al(p, l, h) over L× {1..|p|} × {l..|p|} is
true iff the shortest term that contains the lth to hth symbols in L-program p is a value.
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Definition 3 (Noncode Values [3]). For all languages L, predicate NCV (p, l, h) over L×{1..|p|}×
{l..|p|} is true iff FV (p, l, h) = ∅ and V al(p, l, h).
These preliminary definitions allow us to partition code and noncode symbols in an output
program. Noncode symbols are either removed by the tokenizer or within some closed value in p;
code symbols are all other symbols.
Definition 4 (Tokenize [3]). For all L-programs p = σ1σ2..σn and position numbers i ∈ {1..|p|},
Tokenize(p) returns the sequence of tokens within p.
Definition 5 (Tokenizer-Removed Symbols [3]). For all L-programs p = σ1σ2..σn and position
numbers i ∈ {1..|p|}, TR(p, i) is true iff i is not within the bounds of any token in Tokenize(p).
Definition 6 (Noncode Symbols [3]). For all L-programs p = σ1σ2..σn and position numbers
i ∈ {1..|p|}, Noncode(p, i) is true iff TR(p, i) or for all low and high symbol-position numbers
l ∈ {1..i} and h ∈ {i..|p|}, NCV (p, l, h).
2.2 Defining Injection
Languages are sets of strings, which are sequences of symbols over a fixed alphabet Σ. Any
symbol in the output program could potentially be injected; injected symbols are distinguished by
mirroring each distinct symbol σ ∈ Σ with an injected version σ. The union of all these symbols
forms the tainted alphabet Σ.
Definition 7 (Injected Alphabet [3]). For all alphabets Σ, the injected alphabet Σ is:
{σ | σ ∈ Σ ∨ (∃σ′ ∈ Σ : σ = σ′)}.
Definition 8 (Injected Symbols [3]). For all alphabets Σ and symbols σ ∈ Σ, the predicate
injected(σ) is true iff σ 6∈ Σ.
Definition 9 (Injected Output Language [3]). For all languages L over Σ, the injected output
language L over Σ is:
{σ1..σn | ∃σ′1..σ′n ∈ L : ∀i ∈ {1..n} : (σi=σ′i ∨ σi=σ′i)}
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2.3 Defining Attacks: CIAOs and BroNIEs
Using our definition of code and injection, defining CIAOs becomes trivial. A CIAO occurs
when there exists a symbol in the output program that is both injected and code—i.e., the symbol
is outside the normal output program alphabet Σ and cannot be part of a noncode value.
However, complications arise when certain properties of the output program language allow
noncode symbols to maliciously modify the output program. The following program from Chapter 1
demonstrates that CIAOs do not capture all injection attacks.
$data = ‘\’; securityCheck(); $data .= ‘&f=exit#’;\n f();
The only injected symbol \ is within a string literal ‘\’, so it is noncode. However, a lexical
feature allows the closing single quote to be escaped, rendering it as part of the following larger
string literal.
‘\’; securityCheck(); $data .= ’
Here, strictly noncode injected symbols caused malicious changes in the output program; specif-
ically, the security check was bypassed. Since strictly noncode was injected, this attack is not a
CIAO; a stronger definition is required to capture it.
Typically, the first stage of a compiler will involve tokenizing the program: grouping symbols
together as tokens, collectively referred to as a token stream. Each token will typically contain data
members for the token type, the contained symbols, and the location of the token in the overall
program. Tokens are denoted as τi(text)j , where τ is the token type, text is the captured text (i.e.,
the token’s semantic value), and i and j are the first and last indices where the token appears in
the output program, respectively. For example, for a language supporting algebraic expressions,
the program 5+10 could be tokenized to < NUM1(5)1 , PLUS2(+)2 , NUM3(10)4 >.
In the context of injections, one might assume that injected symbols expand the token stream
of the output program, either by adding new tokens (e.g., 5 in 5+10) or expanding existing ones
(e.g., 0 in 5+10). In a real-world scenario, a string describing a file extension (e.g., ".txt") might
be expanded to include the file name (e.g., "stuff.txt") to form a complete, relative file path in
a shell script. Token expansion is defined more formally as follows.
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Definition 10 (Token expansion [3]). A token t = τi(v)j can be expanded into token t
′ = τ ′i′(v′)j′,
denoted t  t′, iff τ = τ ′, i′ ≤ i ≤ j ≤ j′ and v is a subsequence of v′
The inclusion of indices in token expansion ensures that tokens only expand the strings at the
same point in a program. For example, a token STRING1(“abc”)5 expands to STRING1(“abcd”)6,
but expands neither to STRING2(“abcd”)7 nor STRING11(“abcd”)16. This component is criti-
cal for the following method of detecting noncode-injection attacks, where the output program is
compared to its template, which contains only trusted symbols.
Definition 11 (Template [3]). The template of a program p, denoted Tp, is obtained by replacing
each injected symbol in p with an ε.
In Tp, the ε symbols are ignored; their only purpose is to hold the indices of injected symbols. To
detect an injection attack, both the output program and its template are tokenized and the resulting
token streams are compared to check for a violation fo the noncode insertion and expansion (NIE)
property: injected symbols should strictly insert or expand noncode tokens in the output program.
Definition 12 (NIE Property [3]). An L-program p satisfies the NIE property iff there exist:
• I⊆noncodeToks(p) (i.e., a set of p’s inserted noncode tokens),
• n ∈ N (i.e., a number of p’s expanded noncode tokens),
• {t1..tn}⊆tokenize(Tp) (i.e., a set of template tokens to be expanded), and
• {t′1..t′n}⊆noncodeToks(p) (i.e., a set of p’s expanded noncode tokens)
such that t1  t′1, . . . , tn  t′n and tokenize(p) = ([t′1/t1]..[t′n/tn]tokenize(Tp)) ∪ I.
A BroNIE occurs exactly when an output program has broken the NIE property.
Returning to the previous example attack, Figure 2.1 illustrates how the output program com-
pares to its template. Code symbols are associated with unshaded boxes, noncode symbols with
shaded boxes, and tokenizer-removed symbols with no boxes. The noncode token STRING9(“ε
′′)11
was expanded to STRING9(“\′; securityCheck(); $data. =′”)40. Since STRING tokens are non-
code tokens, this injection is allowed. However, many prohibited changes occured to the template.
The code token ID14(securityCheck)26 and other nearby tokens were removed. The symbols
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Figure 2.1: Partitioning symbols in an output program and its template. This figure is reprinted,
with permission, from [46]. See Appendix A.
within &f=exit, while noncode in the template, became code symbols in the output program; non-
code tokens were removed and code tokens were inserted. Many similar changes occured in the
output program; the only type of prohibited change that did not occur was code token expansion.
Any of these prohibited changes by definition exhibit a BroNIE.
Furthermore, BroNIEs are actually a superset of CIAOs; if a CIAO has occurred, then a BroNIE
has occured. An injected code symbol must insert or expand a code token, which is forbidden by
the NIE property. These definitions—ultimately, the NIE property—provide a formal framework to
reason about injection attacks. The following chapters apply this abstract framework to concrete
systems.
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CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDIES
With a complete theoretical understanding of injection attacks, the following sections detail
some case studies into injection attacks. These target application platforms have some unique
characteristics that make them interesting to analyze versus the typical example of a web application
using a database. Section 3.1 examines injection attacks on Android applications and Section 3.2
examines injection attacks on operating system shells, specifically the Shellshock attacks on Bash.1
3.1 Android
Portions of this section, such as the system-specific attacks on Android, were originally published
in [45], but are the result of collaborative research with which I was significantly involved.
Typically, injection attacks are considered in the context of some centralized service interacting
with many clients, such as web applications. Indeed, the past 15 years have seen a surge in
centralized services for personal computing: cloud computing, online file hosting, media streaming,
social networks, etc., and this trend seems likely to continue. Such services could easily be expected
to use a database and to fall prey to SQL injections and similar attacks.
However, there has also been a trend in the development of decentralized and distributed systems
stemming from the Internet, such as bitcoin cryptocurrency, the TOR relay network, and the
BitTorrent file sharing protocol. In these systems, networked nodes communicate directly with
each other. With injection attacks, the attack model therefore scales with the number of nodes
on the network; every node is potentially exposed to and capable of performing attacks on other
nodes.
Even with centralized services, client nodes may communicate with each other indirectly, using
the service node as a proxy. For example, a centralized chat program propagates messages to their
1Portions of this chapter were previously published in [45].
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intended recipients. Clients may store user information and chat histories in a SQL database,
leaving them potentially vulnerable to injection attacks. This attack model is best exemplified in
cross-site scripting (XSS), where a web service takes malicious data from an attacker and outputs
that data to other clients, resulting in an injection attack when the page is rendered.
Today, nodes on such a network can even be mobile devices, such as cellular phones. With
the increasingly information-driven economy today, mobile devices provide a vast amount of valu-
able information not normally exposed to the network by a traditional personal computer. This
information can be attributed to the array of components integrated into modern devices, such as
cameras, GPS, accelerometers, etc. Injection attacks could certainly be a method to subvert a user
to obtain such information, especially when JavaScript and operating system shells are involved.
In fact, such an attack has been successfully performed on Android devices before, where an imple-
mentation flaw in WebView—essentially a browser embedded into Android applications—allowed
an attacker to dynamically invoke arbitrary Java code [47].
This section specifically looks into how injection attacks could (or do) happen on Android, an
open-source mobile device operating system built on the Linux kernel [48]. Android protects certain
device resources, such as the camera and network interface, using a static permission system [49, 50].
Applications declare in their package manifest which permissions they require to run properly.
These permissions are displayed to the user when installing an application, and the user may then
choose to install the application and grant the required permissions or abort the install; to our
knowledge, applications cannot be installed with fewer permissions than it has requested in off-the-
shelf distributions of Android, nor does the operating system monitor how an application uses its
requested features.
To enforce permission at the system level, Android assigns each application a distinct Linux
user id (uid), with the permissions the application has requested attached to that uid. For example,
each application’s uid is assigned ownership of an exclusive directory in the internal storage’s file
system. Also, while launching a shell is essentially escaping the limitations of Android’s API, we
observed that a shell launched by an application operates with the same uid as that application,
granting it the same set of permissions. The permissions of a compromised application therefore
determine the capabilities of an attacker performing an injection attack on that application.
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public class PingService extends IntentService {
public PingService () {
super("PingService");
}
@Override
protected void onHandleIntent(Intent intent) {
Intent url = intent.getStringExtra("url")
Runtime.getRuntime.exec("sh -c ’ping -c3 " + url + "’");
}
}
Figure 3.1: A sample Android component using tainted input to build a command
We studied the Android operating system, its software development kit (SDK), and applica-
tions to conclude that lack of fine-grained runtime monitoring makes Android applications just as
susceptible to injection attacks as any common web application. These attacks may occur through
use of the operating system shell and SQLite database interface and can compromise the device in
ways unique to mobile devices.
3.1.1 Potential for Attack
The Android SDK is a Java framework. Java’s runtime libraries (included in the SDK) include
the Runtime.exec set of methods [51] and the ProcessBuilder class [52], which allow an application
to create a subprocess and execute some auxiliary program. Specifically included in the Android
SDK is a SQLite database API [53], whereby an application may interact with a database using
SQL queries. These capabilities reveal some interesting potential attacks.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates how a component within an Android application might fall prey to
an injection attack. The component’s job is to ping requested URLs. Since to our knowledge
the Android SDK provides no mechanism to ping a remote host, the component resorts to the
operating system shell to execute the ping program. Other applications send an intent—an inter-
process communication construct in Android—containing the remote hostname to this service, and
it constructs a request to ping the host with 3 packets (as specified by the -c3 option). Since it
does not verify the requested URL string, an attacker may inject a malicious string to change the
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behavior of the shell command by closing the current command with a ; and continuing the input
string with a new command. The following is a list of some example attacks that may exploit this
behavior:
1. Ping drain (Internet permission required) – Mobile devices can generally access the Internet
through Wi-Fi or through the cellular data channel. Providers may limit a user’s data usage
per some unit time. An attacker can use the ping program, with a maximum size packet
(65535 bytes on our device) at the shortest interval (5/sec on our device) to use 3MB/sec of
data using the input string “; ping -i 0.2 -s 65535 usf.edu”. If running constantly,
this program could very quickly accrue a large amount of mobile data usage, leading to
the user being assessed an excessive mobile phone bill, or simply being unable to use their
mobile network data access for the remainder of the billing period.
2. External storage wipe (write access to external storage required) – If the PingService’s
application has write access to external storage, an attacker may exploit this circumstance
to wipe external storage without having any such permissions using a string of the form “;
rm -rf <location>/*” to recursively delete all accessible files in the root external storage
directory without requesting confirmation. The <location> on each individual device’s
file system may vary (e.g., /sdcard, /storage/sdcard), increasing the complexity required to
reliably attack any Android device. If the attacker is acting through a malicious application
on the target device, the attacker can reliably obtain this information using the SDK to
retrieve the location of external storage. Otherwise, an attacker can attempt an attack on
one location or some combination of locations. Access to external storage appears to have
changed in Android KitKat, where applications receive access only to an exclusive directory
in external storage, much like the segmentation of main storage [54]. However, devices with
older versions of Android will not have this protection, and this storage sandboxing still
allows an attacker to wipe data inside that particular directory, which is likely being used
by the application since it requested permission, allowing an attacker to access, remove, or
potentially modify used by the application.
3. Fork bomb (no permissions required) – Android applications are restricted only very loosely
in the number of processes they may create—up to 6656 in our experiments. We were able
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Figure 3.2: Set of Android applications analyzed
to execute a resource denial attack by using an app exploiting this possibility. In this case,
an attacker may execute the fork bomb using an input “; bomb() { bomb|bomb& }; bomb”.
There are 3 commands in the resulting string. The first is the original ping command, which
goes unfulfilled because it never included a url to ping. The second defines a function bomb
that recursively calls itself and pipes its output into another recursive call to itself running
as a background process. The third command initiates the forkbomb, causing processes to
be created exponentially until the operating system denies them, or (as was our experience)
the system is rendered inoperable.
According to Jin et al., mobile devices have many unique channels in which such malicious
injections may occur in addition to typical I/O over a network; these attacks may also occur through
the camera, SMS, near-field communication (NFC), or even the SSID of a nearby wireless network.
Further, Android-specific channels aside from Intents include shared databases like contacts and
calendars, and even the file system where there exist shared space between two applications [44].
3.1.2 Application Study
Following our initial study of the platform, we examined the 50 most popular free applications
(as of March 2015) on the Google Play market, as shown in Figure 3.2. These application names
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were retrieved from the value of each application’s resources/string[@name="app name"] xpath
element, or from the application’s Google Play market page when the xpath’s value did not exist
or was ambiguous. Since we gathered the compiled packages (APKs) of these applications and
they were generally not found to be open-source, inspecting these applications in detail required
examining disassembled bytecode and decompiled source code. We used apktool [55] to extract and
disassemble code into a human-readable form, dex2jar [56] to translate dex bytecode (a separate
format for Android’s Dalvik virtual machine) into Java bytecode, and JD-GUI [57] and JAD [58]
to decompile the Java bytecode and browse the resulting Java code.
Of the applications we studied, 92% use the SQLite database API, all of which applications at
some point call SQLite API methods not guaranteed to be safe—i.e., without support for normal-
izing arguments (such as a user name for a contact query). An example of a safe method is the
SQLiteDatabase.query method, which allows arguments to be bound as closed values before being
placed in the query, and examples of unsafe methods are the SQLiteDatabase.{rawQuery,execSQL}
methods, which take a string program and execute it on the database without doing any argument
binding [53]. 74% of the applications used Runtime.exec methods or ProcessBuilder classes. There
are no analgous safe versions of these methods.
We were able to analyze most applications in sufficient detail to find that auxiliary programs
were executed to escape the limitations of the Android SDK, allowing applications to collect infor-
mation from application logs using the logcat program, get system properties, and use heuristics
to determine whether the device is rooted. Unsafe database API methods like rawQuery were called
to execute queries built from string literals hard-coded in the application, which by Java semantics
precludes injection attacks via those queries.
Our understanding of these applications was limited by code obfuscation and decompiler in-
nacuracies. The Android build system invokes the ProGuard tool by default to obfuscate the
application, where bytecode-level constructs like classes and fields are renamed to make the appli-
cation harder to reverse engineer, limiting the amount of information presented by the application
bytecode for us to analyze [59]. For example, deciding whether a method is invoked is impossible
unless the invocation is trivial, i.e., always or never occurs (c.f. Rice’s theorem). The total code
size we examined was also too large to manually determine when any particular method is trivially
invoked. Therefore, given a case where an application includes an unsafe SQLite API method call,
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we could never be certain whether the method making that unsafe call would be invoked, and
it’s turtles all the way down. This problem is especially of concern to our sample application set
because we found that many of them use third-party libraries, e.g. for advertisement.
This analysis could be improved by more sophisticated tooling. Control-flow analysis could
help to identify trivial application properties. More advanced decompilers would produce more
readable code (though still within limits of ProGuard’s mangling). Better tooling would also allow
us to examine more cases with potential for error, such as when an application calls a safe method
like SQLiteDatabase.query, but just inserts injected values directly into the intial program string
instead of using placeholders and binding those as arguments to be normalized by the SDK.
Another limit to this study is that we examined the most popular applications. With the
expectation that an application’s popularity tends to correlate with application quality, and given
Android’s relatively open application market, we expect that such vulnerabilities could very well
exist in the wild, especially with applications written by less experienced developers.
3.2 Bash and Shellshock
Bash is a Linux operating system shell. The runtime is an interpreter, reading and executing
one command at a time. Generally, commands are sequences of words specifying a program to
execute and its arguments, but Bash also supports structured programming, variable assignment,
etc. In addition to typical programming constructs, Bash has a unique form of evaluation called
word expansion. For example, the word ba$x, where the value of x is sh, expands to bash. Further,
the word *.c expands to a sequence of words containing the name of each C source code file in the
working directory [60].
Figure 3.3 illustrates how an injection attack may also occur on a Bash script. Consider a
service that processes requests for new accounts for users wanting access to a Linux server. The
server might output a script for a shell like Bash to create the account. Such a script could be
maliciously formed as well.
adduser clayton
(a) Benign input
adduser clayton; rm -rf /
(b) Malicious input
Figure 3.3: Example injections into a shell script
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The program adduser is executed with the username clayton to create the account on the
server. Afterward, regardless of the outcome of that command, the script attempts to wipe the
entire root file system. Here, -rf represents options to recursively apply this command to all
subfolders in the root directory / and to force the program to delete the files without asking the
user for confirmation. Notwithstanding other ad-hoc system protections against these kinds of
actions, the results could be catastrophic for the server and all its users.
Bash programs can execute built-in commands or execute external programs—including sub-
shells, generally invoked by calling “bash” in a bash script—which will be executed in a subprocess.
Subshells inherit variable bindings from their parent. Variables are generally bound to terminal
values such as a string literal, but these values can actually be latent function definitions for use in
subshells. To create such a function, the parent sets an environment variable (e.g., via the env or
export commands) to a string of the form ‘() { command1; command2; ... ; commandN }’.
When a child process is invoked, the child inherits the environment from the parent, scanning for
variables matching this pattern. Any such string is then evaluated as code that can be executed
by referring to the associated variable as the first element of a command. Fig. 3.4 demonstrates an
example. The variable x is bound to a string literal (bound by single quotes), but the value of the
string literal represents a function. The second line creates a subshell, which scans the environment
for variables starting with () {. Upon finding the value of x, Bash interprets the characters within
the curly braces as a function definition, and binds the command x to the resulting code. The next
line, instead of using $x to deference x as the string literal ‘() { echo hi; }’, calls x to execute
the code bound to x, which is a separate program with one command (echo hi).
parent$ export x=‘() { echo hi; }’
parent$ bash
child$ x
hi
Figure 3.4: A sample execution where a function definition is used
One of the biggest computer-security stories of the past year—Shellshock attacks—arose from
injection vulnerabilities in this feature of Bash. On its 10-point scale of severity, US-CERT/NIST
rated every one of the six Shellshock vulnerabilities it announced as a 10.0 [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. While
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Shellshock may refer to the entire family of vulnerabilities discovered around that time, we refer to
specifically the first and seemingly most prevalent vulnerability.
While the semantics for functions may seem esoteric, they appear to be intended. The vul-
nerability is that trailing commands following the function definition will be executed when the
child shell evaluates that function. Figure 3.5 is exactly the same as the previous example, with
the exception that there is code following the original function definition. Due to a bug in Bash,
the trailing code was executed immediately upon launching the subshell. An attacker with control
over the end of the function definition is therefore capable of arbitrary code execution, within the
constraints of Bash and the target system. In this specific example, the program appears to behave
the same way, but the attack code fetches some malicious script over the network and executes it
without any visible output beyond the injected symbols to indicate an attack has happened.
parent$ export x=‘() { echo hi; }; curl hax.com/attack.sh | bash’
parent$ bash
child$ x
hi
Figure 3.5: A subshell inadvertently executes the code following the function definition
The flaw in Bash exposing the Shellshock vulnerability was quickly remedied, but as is common
in the practice of computer security, as one patch for Shellshock became available, additional
vulnerabilities were discovered, sometimes in the patches themselves, and sometimes in ways that
made older patches ineffective [12, 13, 14, 15]. Without foundational principles to rely on, for
understanding injection attacks in Bash, the community iterated the hack-patch cycle many times.
These iterations of incrementally patching implementations in response to every newly noticed
injection vulnerability don’t produce trustworthy systems. For example, we have no assurance
that similar, yet-unnoticed injection vulnerabilities are absent from the standard implementations
of Bash shells. Achieving a higher level of trustworthiness will instead require foundational, well-
tested theories for understanding injection attacks, in addition to well-understood tools—built
on those foundational principles—for automatically preventing injection attacks, even the yet-
unnoticed ones.
At the surface, Shellshock is yet another injection attack. However, Shellshock poses some
unique challenges to building such well-understood, precise detection mechanisms because it is a
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real-world example of a second-order injection attack, where tainted input is originally dynamically
passive in the output program and only later becomes code [3]. Consequently, Shellshock attacks
cannot be precisely detected by instrumenting the target application producing these programs.
For example, an application may create a shell parent that launches a subshell sub1, which only
upon some nontrivial condition defines a function using tainted input from parent and launches
another subshell sub2 to trigger Shellshock. It cannot be decided whether an attack has occurred
until that condition is evaluated at runtime; the output program has to be instrumented as well as
the target application.
The following chapters introduce the design, implementation, and evaluation of a custom shell
language, a string taint tracking mechanism, and a mechanism to precisely detect arbitrary-order
injection attacks on output programs SQLite and the custom language, including Shellshock. The
mechanisms’ system-specific implementations and constraints shed light on some of the practical
challenges—beyond taint tracking overhead—to feasibly and precisely detecting injection attacks
in practice.
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CHAPTER 4
A CUSTOM SHELL LANGUAGE
Though Shellshock is a Bash vulnerability, Bash’s implementation inherently presents a lot
of challenges to designing and implementing a precise mechanism to prevent vulnerabilities like
Shellshock, as detailed in Section 4.1. Traditionally, a language dictates the design of enforcement
mechanisms for injection attacks on output programs in that language because the partition of
code and noncode is a static, language-level concern; the implementation of interpreters, compilers,
and runtimes for output languages are normally irrelevant. However, as discussed in Chapter 3.2,
Shellshock is a second-order attack; the language’s implementation is a great concern because the
implementation must provide or be instrumented with a taint tracker and detection mechanism.
Since the objective here is to evaluate Shellshock and injection attacks on operating system shells
in general, not Bash specifically, I created a custom shell language as the basis for the design of
injection attack detection on operating system shells.
4.1 The Case for a Custom Shell Language
Bash’s implementation is both complex and nonstandard [61]. Typically, a programming lan-
guage can be expressed with regular expressions for lexical analysis, a context-free grammar for
syntactic analysis, and a turing machine for semantic analysis. Regular expressions and context-
free grammars, while less expressive than turing machines, have the benefit of being simpler and
much more amenable to analysis. Even from the beginning lexical stages, most of a Bash program
is interpreted using a generated lexical analyzer, but certain parts are instead interpreted ad-hoc in
a context-sensitive manner; Bash keeps a finite history of tokens to determine how to interpret the
next symbols. An example is the ‘time’ command, which provides support for timing the execution
of a command pipeline. A series of symbols time, when appearing for example at the beginning
of a program and not as part of a larger token, will be tokenized differently—i.e., as a distinct
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Token text time echo ThisIsTimed | time echo ThisIsNotTimed
Token type TIME WORD WORD PIPE WORD WORD WORD
Figure 4.1: An example of context-sensitive lexical analysis in Bash
TIME token—from the same sequence of symbols if they appeared in the same form but later in
the pipeline—i.e., as just another WORD.
Figure 4.1 shows how Bash would handle tokenization for the input program
time echo ThisIsTimed | time echo ThisIsNotTimed. In Bash, multiple commands can be
chained together in a pipeline, with the output of one command sent to the input of another
command, using the pipe (|) symbol. There are two commands in this program, but the beginning
instance of time is part of neither one; it is more of a metacommand, instructing Bash to record
and print the execution time of the commands represented by the tokens that follow. The second
instance of time—even though it appears at the beginning of a command—is instead interpreted
as an instruction to call the external program time if it exists, just as if it were any other occurence
of cat, grep, etc.
Even for parsing alone, about 1000 of the approximately 6000-line Yacc grammar file is devoted
to production rules; the rest are generally devoted to helper functions and macros. Not count-
ing libraries, the source code is approximately 70,000 lines long. These complexities make for a
newcomer modifying the existing code to include modules like taint propagation an intractable
task.
Irrespective of code complexity, Bash is implemented in C, a language with only weak typ-
ing. Precise runtime monitoring requires control-flow integrity to prove that a security mechanism
exhibits complete mediation over an aspect of a target program [62]. For example, the Bash in-
terpreter could be instrumented with a taint tracker that propagates taint data when assigning a
variable to some text in the program code (any symbols of which may be tainted). However, given
C’s direct memory access, another point in the program (possibly under the control of an attacker)
could point directly to the address containing the taint information for a given string and clear
the taint data. Control-flow integrity is easily obtained as a consequence type-safety—for example,
such direct modifications to data memory would be forbidden—but in this case it would be very
difficult or impossible to prove that Bash’s implementation has such integrity. Given the vulner-
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programs p ::= c∞
commands c ::= e∗ | x = w | x | lash
exprs e ::= $x | v
values v ::= w | ε
vars x ::= TV
words w ::= TW
functions f ::= c* c*
Figure 4.2: Lash first-order abstract syntax
abilities already seen in Bash, the semantics of the C and its preprocessor, and the size of Bash’s
code base, Bash is not likely to have such integrity. This inherent lack of guarantees precludes us
from instrumenting Bash to implement any kind of precise mechanism1.
Given these problems posed by Bash, and the goal of studying injection attacks and Shellshock
directly versus Bash itself, I created a simplified shell language as the basis for studying injection
vulnerabilities on operating system shells.
4.2 Lash: A Minimal Shell Language
Lash—for Lackluster Shell— is a minimal language emulating Bash-like behavior to the extent
required to be vulnerable to Shellshock. Its features include:
• commands and arguments (using string literals),
• variable substitution (via word expansion),
• dynamically declared functions, and
• subshell function imports (to be vulnerable to Shellshock).
4.2.1 Syntax and Semantics
Lash’s first-order abstract syntax is shown in Figure 4.2. At a glance, this syntax looks like
it describes some simple shell language—it’s nearly a subset of Bash. Programs are sequences of
commands. Programs are potentially infinite in size to reflect that Bash is an interpreter. Since
interpreters dynamically read and execute a stream of symbols, there’s no guarantee that the
1This analysis is based on reviewing the Bash’s source code at version 3.4—months before the Shellshock attacks—
and may not reflect the current state of the code [61].
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input stream is finite. A command can appear as a sequence of expressions, which once evaluated
represent a program to execute and its arguments, if any; a variable assignment to some word; a
function invocation by calling a variable bound to some command sequence; or subshell execution
by calling lash. An expression may appear as a word or a reference to a variable bound to a word, or
the empty word ε, appearing when the value of a variable is fetched but that variable is not bound
to any value. The terminals indicating the concrete structure of variables and words, denoted TV
and TW, respectively, are left up to the implementation. It is expected that implementation will
make ε a runtime form.
The most notable difference from Bash is the handling of functions. This grammar includes an
explicit nonterminal for functions, but there is no derivation from programs to functions. This detail
is a consequence of the desire to make Lash minimal while still supporting Shellshock. Functions
appearing in Shellshock attacks become code only later; initially they are values in the output
program. Allowing statically-declared functions (as Bash does) adds complexity without enhancing
our understanding of injection attacks. As a result, functions are runtime forms.
Figure 4.3 formalizes Lash’s dynamic semantics, which are rather simple until functions are
involved. Lash’s state is a pair (F,E): a function context F : variables → commands*, and a word
context E : variables→ words, representing traditional shell environment variable mappings.
There are two forms of evaluation in the dynamic semantics which are assigned different names:
expression evaluation, occurring in the form of variable substitution; and command execution,
which corresponds to statements in C-like languages. Command execution propagates variable
substitution and emulates execution of the command on the system.
Figure 4.3 uses a few helper judgement forms and notation. Parentheses are used to denote
tuples and to resolve potential ambiguity. When a variable describes a collection of objects, an s
is appeneded to the variable name—furthermore, a variable css denotes a collection of collections.
Since commands are sequences, 〈〉 is used to denote an empty sequence. The operator (::) : α×α∞ →
α∞, borrowed from ML-style syntax, prepends an element to the beginning of a sequence. The
(@) : α∗ × α∞ → α∞ operator concatenates two sequences. Rules SP1 and SP2 explicitly define
the judgement form S+ (x : y) = S′, which describes a function of the form (α× β)×{(α× β)} →
{(α × β)}, expressing that upon adding a variable-value binding to a set of bindings, the existing
value for that variable, if any, is replaced. The ⊕ operator, defined in the rules of the judgement
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S + (x:y) = S’
∃y′ : S = S′ ∪ (x : y′)
S + (x : y) = S′ ∪ (x : y) SP1
∀y′ : (x : y′) 6∈ S
S + (x : y) = S ∪ (x : y) SP2
S ⊕ S′ = S′′
S′ = (x : y) ∪ S′′
S ⊕ S′ = (S + (x : y))⊕ S′′ MP1 S ⊕ ∅ = S MP2
E ` e 7→ v
(x : w) ∈ E
E ` $x 7→ w SE1
(x : w) /∈ E
E ` $x 7→ ε SE2
(F,E, p) 7→ (F ′, E′, p′)
E ` ei 7→ vi
(F,E, (e1 · · · ei · · · en) :: cs) 7→ (F,E, (e1 · · · vi · · · en) :: cs)
SC1
(F,E, (v1 · · · vn) :: cs) 7→ (F,E, cs)
SC2
(F,E, (x = v) :: cs) 7→ (F,E + (x : v), cs) SC3
(x : cs′) ∈ F
(F,E, x :: cs) 7→ (F,E, cs′@cs) SC4
∀cs′ : (x : cs′) 6∈ F
(F,E, x :: cs) 7→ (F,E, cs) SC5
(F ′, css′) = {((x : cs), cs′) | ∃w : (x : w) ∈ E ∧ w rep (cs, cs′)} cs′ = @
cs′∈css′
〈〉
(F,E, lash :: cs′′) 7→ (F ⊕ F ′, E, cs′@cs′′) SC6
Figure 4.3: Lash dynamic semantics
form S ⊕ S′ = S′′, simply extends the + operator to multiple bindings, replacing any bindings in
S with those in S’, or adding the bindings when no conflict exists.
The judgement form E ` e 7→ v denotes that a word context E derives that an expression steps
to a value. If the word context E binds variable x to a word w, $x is substituted with w. Otherwise,
$x is substituted with ε.
Rules SC1 through SC6 describe how a commands are executed. Interestingly, they appear in
the judgement form (F,E, p) 7→ (F ′, E′, p′). Due to functions, commands can change the shape
of the rest of the program. Hence, the behavior of commands is best specfied in the context of a
program.
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Rule SC1 propagates variable substitution to a command in any order—e.g., given a command
echo $x $y, the order of subsitution of x and y is irrelevant since there is no side-effect to substi-
tution.
Rule SC2 describes emulates a fully-evaluated being executed on the environment, which at the
language level just steps to the next command; there is no feedback from the command as to its
return value or whether is succeeded or failed. The first word in the sequence specifies the program
to execute, and the remaining words specify arguments to the program to execute; instances of ε
are ignored. A command of the form ε∗ does nothing.
Rule SC3 binds a variable to a word, adding or replacing the binding in E. Rule SC4 and
SC5 describe function invocation, which is performed by calling the variable to which it is bound
(without using the $ operator). When calling x, if x is bound in F to a command sequence, that
function body is scheduled to be executed next.
The relative complexity rule SC6, defining function importing, warrants further explanation.
The command lash emulates launching a subshell. At this point, functions are imported, as in Bash.
Lash finds functions to import with the help of the implementation, which must define a surjective
function rep : words → functions, which indicates that a word w represents or is tokenized and
parsed as a function. With the help of rep, Lash searches for functions to import. Note that
the F, described as a function context, actually maps variables to finite sequences of commands
instead of elements of the functions syntactic category, which specify two finite sequences. The
second sequence of commands is never stored in F because the second sequence represents the
trailing code after a function definition, which is executed upon importing the function. Instead,
the first sequence is bound to the variable in F and the second sequence is scheduled to be executed
next, just as in Shellshock. Some of the complexity of rule SC6 arises from multiple simultaneous
imports. When importing function definitions, their corresponding trailing code sequences are all
concatenated together with the @ operator, starting the empty sequence 〈〉 as a seed value (order
of concatenation is arbitrary), and the resulting sequence is then inserted at the beginning of the
rest of the program.
The handling of variables is a bit different compared to a standard formal language like the
lambda calculus. A variable may be mapped to a command and a word simultaneously, since
operations depending on the two contexts are syntactically distinct; variables mapped to words
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within E may be substituted using an expression of the form $x, while functions bound to variables
may be invoked by executing a command of the form x. Also, in both cases, operations on unmapped
variables do not cause the program to get stuck. Cases of unmapped variable dependencies could
just be considered ill-typed and therefore undefined for dynamic semantics, but allowing operations
on unbound variables more closely resembles that of Bash.
Without functions, there would be no function context, and no commands could add other
commands to execute in the program. That is, notwithstanding this behavior, Lash semantics are
quite simple, which can be attributed to several key ways it differs from Bash.
1. Lash lacks conditional expressions and branching.
2. The semantics do not require the implementation to interact with the underlying system in
any way.
3. Functions do not take arguments or return results.
4. One a subshell is launched, the parent is disregarded; Lash operates through the remainder
of the program as if it is the subshell.
The properties specified simplify the semantics of the language. As a result of (1), programs and
their executions are strictly linear. This property contrasts with assembly languages, where a static
or computed jump could return a program to a previous point in execution, leaving control flow as
a cyclic graph. In Lash, there is no backtracking to previously-executed commands, so the control
flow graph of any given program is totally linear. Item (2) mostly simplifies implementation, since
the execution of other external programs isn’t a concern in this case. Items (3) and (4) preclude
the language from requiring any kind of implicit or explicit tree structure in the semantics for call
stacks and process trees. These aspects, coupled with finite expression evaluation (at most one
substitution) and the potentially infinite program length, demonstrate Lash to be an ω-regular
language.
4.2.2 Injection Attacks in Lash
Since the term value is already attributed to fully-evaluated expressions, when describing non-
code elements they are denoted passive constructs.
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Definition 13 (Lash Noncode). Noncode in Lash is defined as ε and the set of words, except when
a word appears as the first word of an expression sequence.
The constructs described in Definition 13 are expression values, which don’t step. Normally,
they would always be considered noncode, but one special condition is made for words: if appear-
ing within an expression sequence, it must not be the first element of the sequence. Expression
sequences represent a program to execute and its arguments, and the first word in that sequence
is always the command to execute. That is, adduser clayton is a valid injection, because only
an argument was injected, while adduser clayton is considered code, because it specifies a call to
some external program. Executing an external program is analagous to calling an internal function;
both specify dynamic computation. All constructs not described in Definition 13 are code.
In practice, we may also wish to prohibit options being injected into commands—e.g., rm -r
filename. The -r flag makes the command recursive, applying to all child elements in the file tree.
However, we chose to omit this restriction for several reasons.
• Specifying command options via dash-notation is convention rather than a language feature
• there is no clear distinction between options and their arguments. For example, “-Ifolder”
specifies folder as an argument to the -I option in GCC, while “-rf” specifies two indepen-
dent options for the rm program.
• Options don’t specify dynamic computation for the shell itself.
Shellshock occurs exactly when rule SC6 is applied, and there exists a BroNIE within cs′
(the trailing code immediately scheduled for execution). That is, a subshell is invoked while an
environment variable is bound to some value which represents a function, and the second command
sequence in the function contains a BroNIE. If the first sequence of commands contains a BroNIE
then it is still a second-order injection attack, but is not as severe as Shellshock because at least
the malicious function must be explicitly invoked to be executed, whereas Shellshock execution
happens involuntarily upon initializing the subshell, i.e., in a way the user or system administrator
likely never intended.
That said, injection attacks are very closely tied to concrete syntax, since injected symbols
may affect the code-noncode partition of the resulting output program and its template. The next
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chapter examines an implementation of Lash and a prototype taint tracker and injection attack
detection mechanism to assess the problem further.
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CHAPTER 5
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCRETE SYSTEMS
Chapter 3 examined injection attacks on Android systems and operating system shells. Chap-
ter 4 provided a formal definition of a custom language called Lash, giving a simpler foundation
on which to evaluate mechanisms to defend against injection attacks—including Shellshock—on
operating system shells. This chapter builds on the previous chapters with a discussion on design,
implementation, and evaluation of a concrete Lash parser and runtime, a mechanism for taint track-
ing, and an injection attack detection mechanism for both SQLite and Lash (including Shellshock),
corresponding to the studies performed in previous chapters.
Portions of this section describe synthesis work that began while working with Smith following
our evaluation of injection attacks on Android systems [45]. These components include the taint
tracker and detection mechanism—at least, for SQLite. Both mechanisms have since been updated;
please see their respective sections below.
Ultimately, even aside from its widespread compatibility and high-level semantics and libraries,
Java proved to be the best implementation language for all components.
• Lash requires no direct system access (e.g. process forking for commands and subshells) since
it only emulates shell behavior; no low-level functionality is required.
• Using Java allows us to then use AspectJ for aspect-oriented programming [63].
• Using Java also allows us to take advantage of the ANTLR parser generator [64], which has
a large base of grammars [65], and for new grammars removes the need for manual abstract
syntax tree creation, which would have been needed with a more primitive parser generator.
• Java also provides many safety guarantees that a language like C does not (such as by us-
ing implicit references instead of explicit pointers), allowing greater confidence in complete
mediation of the implemented security mechanisms.
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program ::= command (separator command)∗
separator ::= (SEMICOLON | NEWLINE)+
function ::= ‘() {’ program ‘}’ (separator program)∗
command ::= word word∗ | NAME EQUALS word
word ::= ‘$’ NAME | NAME | NUMBER | GLOB
NAME ::= [a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9 ]∗
NUMBER ::= [0-9]+
GLOB ::= [^ ]+ | SQUOTE .∗ SQUOTE
Figure 5.1: Lash EBNF grammar and lexicon (some lexer detail omitted for brevity)
• Since Android applications are generally programmed in Java (c.f. Section 3.1), this lan-
guage choice allows both output languages to share a single taint-tracking mechanism for
both output languages and a framework for injection attack detection (which requires extra
implementation only for each language-specific component).
Thesis details will be elaborated when necessary in the following sections.
5.1 Output Program Languages: Lash and SQLite
Lexers and parsers for both languages were generated by ANTLR 4 [64]. SQLite had an existing
grammar [65]. We were only concerned with first-order attacks on SQLite, so no runtime was
required. Lash’s grammar and runtime were hand-written.
Figure 5.1 shows Lash’s concrete syntax in EBNF form, corresponding to the the first-order
abstract syntax in Figure 4.2. Some lexer detail is omitted from the figure: single quotes are used
to delimit anonymous string literals that appear in production rules (e.g., the $ in command rules),
while SQUOTE is used when a literal (i.e., escaped) single quote is required (e.g., in the GLOB
terminal); some obviously named terminals are undefined but should still be clear; and quoted
GLOBs capture only the matched text inside the quotes, rather than the quotes too.
In this grammar, programs are sequences of commands separated by some separator, which is a
finite sequence of semicolons and/or newlines. Programs are actually finite in the implementation;
while infinite programs were easy to integrate formally, infinite programs posed needless complexity
for implementation. For example, programs could not be treated as strings; streams would be
required instead.
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Functions correspond exactly to the abstract syntax, allowing function definitions and trailing
code to appear just as they do in Bash, beginning with “() {” and ending with “}”, optionally
followed by a separator and the Shellshock trailing command sequence.
A command may be a word sequence, where the first word is the command to execute, or
a variable assignment. While the abstract syntax handled function and subshell invocations as
syntactically separate commands, the implementation handles this more simply: For any fully-
evaluted command sequence, if the first word is “lash”, a subshell is lauched; if the word is bound
to some function, that function is invoked; otherwise, it represents an execution of some external
program identified by that word. The implementation is able to handle commands this way due to
the way words are implemented, which are explained in further depth below.
A word may represent variable subsitution for some NAME by preceding the NAME with $. A
fully-evaluated word (sometimes denoted a word value) is a NAME, NUMBER, or GLOB. NAME
is any word beginning with an alphabetic character. NUMBER is an artifact of plans for function
arguments accessed by words of the form $0, $1, etc. GLOB represents some other string without
special meaning, including quoted strings. Standard lexical precedence applies: the lexer will match
whatever rule allows it to match the most symbols; otherwise, it will match whatever rule is declared
first (i.e., the string x will always be a NAME and not a GLOB). NAME terminals are used both
as variables and as words in the abstract syntax; the abstract syntax identified variables and words
differently, but did not require them to be lexically distinct, and this behavior mimics that of Bash.
For example, the string “directory” can be a variable name or a literal argument to a command.
The behavior, however, is equivalent. The empty word ε is implemented as an empty string, and
may be introduced by the GLOB ‘‘". Since ε is captured in the GLOB terminal, the grammar
does not need an ε production rule.
Notwithstanding some minor deviations—such as allowing subshells to take a program to exe-
cute by executing the subshell with a command string of the form lash -c ‘<programToExecute>’—
the implementation follows the dynamic semantics a specified in Figure 4.3. Corresponding to
Definition 13, noncode in this implementation is exactly the set of word values exactly when they
appear as arguments to an external program invocation or to a variable assignment. The noncode
partitioning in the concrete implementation is slightly less straightforward because a NAME can be
a variable or word, and injection into a variable is an attack because variables are open expressions.
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Front -end
Lexer/ Parser
Back-end
Runt ime
Target
Applicat ion
Lash
Detect ion
Algorithm
Taint
Tracker
BroNIE Detector
Figure 5.2: Composition of our implementation. Arrows indicate a “has-a” relation.
5.2 Security Mechanisms
Figure 5.2 illustrates the implementation arcthiecture, specifically for Lash. Solid boxes rep-
resent individual components, while dotted boxes indicate cohesion. Arrows indicate a “has-a”
relation. As expected, the target application has a taint tracker and detection mechanism and
access to Lash to run the output program. The detection algorithm needs to have access to the
front-end of the output program language to tokenize the output program and determine which
components are code. The unique part for Lash, since second-order attacks are possible, is that
the runtime has a taint tracker and detection algorithm as well; the SQLite component is identical
except for that detail.
For taint tracking, Chin and Wagner describe a promising solution by modifying the Java
runtime’s String class, which is backed by a character array, by adding a corresponding boolean
array to indicate a taint bit for each character and adjusting method definitions to manage this
data. When we attempted this solution on the default JVM, we appeared to encounter the same
issues where making such a change to String broke expectations of predefined offsets for members
of the String class, which did not yield an easily rectifiable solution; the authors even chose to
pursue a different JVM [38].
In our case, we wanted a more universal solution, and taint tracking is only a means to the
end of studying precise detection. Instead, we implemented the taint tracker as a separate com-
ponent, and taint tracking as an aspect using AspectJ for aspect-oriented programming [63]. The
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target application marks which strings are tainted and uses a special wrapper method for string
concatenation—denoted concat. In aspect-oriented terms, the mechanism is advice inserted when
concat returns, combining the taint information from the two strings that formed the newly created
one. In practice, pointcuts can be adjusted as needed (such as when contents of a text box are
extracted).
Taint information is held by mapping a String object reference to a boolean array reference,
with bit i set to true in the array if and only if the ith character in the string is tainted. In Java,
object references support the == operator, which returns true iff the operands reference the same
object. Objects may also override the Object.equals(Object) method, which returns true iff the
self and the argument are considered equal. This is useful when there may exist duplicates of the
same object in memory; for example, an application may have one instance of the String “Cancel”
for each dialog box. A HashMap is a hash table that resolves mapping collisions by calling equals
to determine whether two references are considered the same. Such collisions would certainly be
problematic for taint tracking, where two distinct string objects are equal but only one originated
from an untrusted source. Consequently, the taint tracker uses an IdentityHashMap, which resolves
collisions by checking whether the object references are equal (x == y).
The detection mechanism is an implementation of the algorithm specified in [3]. Using a pointcut
where a predefined method call is invoked to execute the output program, the detection aspect
inserts advice to perform BroNIE detection.
The following chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the implementations and concludes lessons
learned from the project as a whole.
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
Related work has established a theoretical understanding of the injection attack problem do-
main [3] , and this paper has done so for Shellshock in particular. By formalizing a custom language,
there is clear idea of the problems the implementation is designed to solve. This chapter evalutes
the effectiveness of the implementations described in Chapter 5 in terms of correctness and perfor-
mance, and concludes results from the project as a whole.
6.1 Experimental Methodology
The implementation was tested using a simple target application for both output languages.
The target application takes a trusted prefix p, untrusted input i, and trusted suffix s of an output
program; builds the output program by blindly concatnating the strings (p + i + s); and outputs
the resulting program for execution.
For evaluating correctness, test cases were designed to perform injections on different benign
and malicious places for various synactical structures. For example, injecting a word value into the
rvalue of a variable assignment should be allowed, while inserting a variable reference should not;
injecting a semicolon into a quoted string is allowed since it’s just a GLOB terminal, but it should
not be allowed otherwise because it’s a command separator.
For performance testing, the security mechanisms were tested with programs of approximate
lengths 15 to 550. Performance test cases were formed by concatenating copies of correctness test
programs; each program was tested with 1 to 9 copies of itself concatenated together. The test cases
were all performed 20 times. The experiment then depended on whether it was testing strictly taint-
tracking overhead or combined overhead. When testing strictly taint-tracking overhead, nothing
additional occurs, and the entire test was carried out 1000 times. When testing program building
and execution, the execution part was simulated by just making the output program language’s
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front-end parse the output program (which would engage the BroNIE detection pointcut), and then
the entire test was carried out only 20 times. Since the first round of data was often found to be an
outlier—presumably due to class loading the first time a class is encountered in the runtime—the
first round was discarded.
Typically we could run the entire program instead of just parsing it to measure overhead of
the operation as a whole, but Lash is pretty strictly compute-bound, and any attempts to make
it otherwise would be still only simulated, compared to SQLite which already has an industrial-
strength implementation. If we were to measure it this way, Lash would appear to have an extremely
high overhead because the runtime would not be doing much. We also could not accurately simulate
real execution time by program length, because a command grep someWord *.txt is small, but
might be an extremely computationally intensive operation given a current working directory with
extremely large text files. However, the reliable intersection between the two available to us is the
parser, which we know will be invoked for each program. Therefore we include only parsing in
the detection overhead measurements. This approach also allows us to view the data as an upper-
bound; with any type of runtime behavior synchronized with the application, the overall runtime
can be expected to decrease since the runtime of the output program execution is extended by
behavior unrelated to the security mechanism.
The variable iterations per use case is due to some contraints on timing accuracy. This is per-
haps the biggest drawback of having used Java. I found that Java’s timing accuracy was variable: it
could measure elapsed, user CPU time, and combined user and system CPU time, but the accuracy
of these mechanisms was dependent on the system. On my Linux machine, the user time measure-
ment had only 10ms accuracy, and elapsed time proved to be wildly innacurate for performance
comparisons. To cope with this issue, and since user time is what we wish to ideally measure, these
commands were executed in bulk to the extent that a sufficiently large enough time span would
have passed—on the order of seconds or tens of seconds—to allow reliably determining overhead.
Performing 1000 iterations of the already extensive parsing operations proved a prohibitively long
task, so combined taint tracking and detection test iterations were greatly reduced.
37
# Is BroNIE Detected Description
1 N N Assignment rvalue injected
2 N N Assignment rvalue partially injected
3 N N Assignment rvalue injected with variable reference afterward
4 Y Y Assignment lvalue injected
5 Y Y Assignment lvalue partially injected
6 Y Y Name of executable program injected
7 N N Argument to executable program injected
8 Y Y Variable substitution injected
9 Y Y Variable name injected in trusted substitution
10 Y Y Newline injected to separate commands
11 Y Y Semicolon injected to separate commands
12 N N Newline injected into quoted glob
13 N N Semicolon injected into quoted glob
14 N N No injections
15 Y Y Entire program injected
16 N N Function definition injected as glob, but no subshell launched
17 Y Y Function definition injected as glob, with subshell launched
Figure 6.1: Lash BroNIE functional test results
6.2 Results and Analysis
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the test results for Lash and SQLite, respectively. In all test cases,
the BroNIE detection mechanism succeeded at identifying exactly when an injection attack has
occurred.
Performance results are shown in Figure 6.3. Average taint-tracking overhead was 285.1%
for Lash programs, and 225% for SQLite programs, with a standard deviation of 41% and 10.5%,
respectively. However, we see some wild variation in the tracking and detection combined overhead,
with Lash at 379.3% and Sqlite at 5.4%. This data was highly unintuitive at first and initially
appeared to be a test implementation flaw. However, this data appears to be correct, though it
is exaggerated from what we’d likely see in practice. SQLite’s extremely low combined overhead
is a consequence of the implementation and the mock output executable code (the mock SQLite
library, in this case) using the same implementation language. Since the parse tree is already in
memory, the mechanism simply takes the existing parse tree to evaluate the output program for
BroNIEs. In practice it would probably have to be responsible for parsing the programs itself,
indicating the runtime might double, leaving the overhead around 100% since the total cpu time
for program parsing was found to be orders of magnitude greater than that of program building.
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# Is BroNIE Detected Description
1 N N Integer value injected
2 N N Integer value partially injected
3 N N String value partially injected
4 N N Null injected
5 Y Y CURRENT DATE injected
6 Y Y Expression injected
7 Y Y Operator injected between trusted values
8 Y Y Comment injected without removing code after it
9 Y Y Comment injected removing code after it
10 Y Y Quote injected to terminate a string early, without removing code
11 Y Y Quote injected to terminate a string early, removing code after it
12 Y Y Table name injected in CREATE TABLE statement
13 Y Y CREATE injected in CREATE TABLE statement
Figure 6.2: SQLite BroNIE functional test results
Output Language Metric Min Max Mean Median Std Dev
Lash Taint-Tracking 180.0% 320.8% 285.1% 304.0% 41.2%
Lash Tracking + Detection 132.4% 412.0% 379.3% 412.0% 87.2%
Sqlite Taint-Tracking 200.0% 233.3% 219.0% 225.0% 10.5%
Sqlite Tracking + Detection 4.7% 6.4% 5.4% 5.4% 0.5%
Figure 6.3: Overhead of security mechanisms
However, we can draw two significiant conclusions from this data: there may be a workaround for
the security mechanisms having to parse the output programs to determine which tokens are code
by using the existing output program exectable’s parse tree (and therefore this low overhead might
be attainable), and the runtime of the output program’s specified computation has a huge effect
on what the overhead is considered to be.
Consider the effect of the target application’s operation as a whole. The execution of the output
script may be asynchronous, but my experience in software engineering tells me that it will not be;
usually, we want to be certain when the output program has completed execution (and potentially
receive feedback, e.g., whether the databse insert succeeded), and if not then we will only want to
make the call asynchronous when performance issues arise. Therefore, it is safe to assume (and is
indeed worst case) that the runtime of the output program affects the runtime of the entire system.
This is difficult to measure with Lash since it doesn’t actually interact with the environment. In any
case, the output program’s compiler will likely have to parse the output program once again after it
has been received, making it happen twice for the same program. This runtime overhead is at the
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public abstract class Monitor {
...
abstract List <Token > getNoncodeTokens(ParseTree tree);
abstract List <? extends Token > tokenize(String pgm);
abstract String getTypeName(int tokenType );
...
}
Figure 6.4: Abstract Monitor methods, which could be implemented for each language
architectural level; even if we were to highly optimize the code, I can’t imagine the solution would
be attractive for high-throughput use cases. That said, it appears that for use cases where there is
high risk and low throughput, the output program’s behavior is naturally already computationally
intensive, and/or there are not strict latency requirements, the benefit of transparent injection
attack detection could certainly be worth paying the runtime cost.
The architectural overhead mentioned above brings up the glaring issue of software complexity.
In order to minmize duplication of parsing, both the target application and the output program’s
compiler or interpreter would have to be engineered to take token streams and/or parse trees
and/or abstract syntax trees to minimize that logic. Both applications would then have to agree
on the structure of the data being passed as well. By unifying implementation to Java, I was
able to create a framework for BroNIE detection and taint tracking shared between both output
programs. Figure 6.4 shows a stub of that code, where other language’s monitors would just inherit
from Monitor and specify which tokens are noncode in a parse tree, how to tokenize a program,
and mapping a token type encoding to its descriptive name.1 In practice this luxury would not
likely be present, given that applications and services are generally written in different higher-level
languages today, and programs like SQLite and Bash are both implemented in C and executed as
separate processes. To share data would require inter-process communication and some kind of
cross-platform serialization like json, xml, or a custom binary format.
Taint-tracking has some other characteristics that also poses some high risks to implementing
these mechanisms in practice. In the performance testing, tests ran up to approximately 30 string
concatenations to arrive at the output program. In practice, tainted string might go through a
1I broke the rule of favoring composition over inheritance in this case; a monitor should simply have a language
which provides this functionality.
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much larger amount of a wider variety of operations—in fact, tainted data might not even be
a string in the first place (e.g., it could be a number which was deserialized from some service
call). The architectural complexity of identifying trusted and untrusted sources of data poses great
uncertainty too. I expect taint tracking to be the biggest hinderance to the practical adoption of
this technology because no software library would likely solve the issue of identifying and reliably
tracking each consumer’s trusted and untrusted data sources.
For more work on verifying our approach to designing and implementing enforcement mecha-
nisms, it would be valuable to test randomly-generated programs for both correctness and perfor-
mance in the hopes of generating unanticipated test cases. This could potentially yield cases of
implementation errors or problems with the noncode partitioning for that target language. It also
could help us deduce conclusions about performance from patterns in a large set of test data.
6.3 Closing Remarks
All overhead concerns aside, this project has successfully provided experimental verification
of the ideas presented in [16] and [3], and shows that the ideas can be extended even to more
procedural languages.
Chapter 4 indicates that Bash, and perhaps operating system shells as a whole, could greatly
benefit from a formal analysis or even formal design from scratch in order to better understand them.
Notwithstanding helper notation and judgement forms, Lash semantics are completely described
with 8 rules, and that includes the extra rules for deliberately implementing Shellshock. Lash
was formalized actually after it was implemented, and had the formalizing been completed first,
it would have greatly changed my approach to implementing Lash. For example, I began by
including a complex set of features including word quoting and expansion, function arguments,
and subprocesses—the initial prototype was even in C since operating system shells are system-
level tools. These features proved extraneous relative to the goal of simply implementing a shell
that exhibits shellshock, and code is left over from those approaches as a result. Formally defining
syntax and dynamic semantics provides literally a step-by-step guide to designed behavior. A second
attempt at this implementation would be guided by the formalisms, resulting an implementation
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that is simpler, easier to understand, and therefore giving a higher degree of confidence in its
security.
It is quite unsurprising to find such a critical bug as Shellshock in the Bash’s implementation
related to a function called stupidly hack special variables (c.f. version 4.3 in [61]), and it’s
not totally clear why this feature was implemented this way; for example, why not allow functions
created normally [60] to just be inherited by subshells instead of being dynamically evaluted? Why
set up the implementation so that code being parsed is potentially being executed simultaneously?
Some features that make the language more complex are clearly beneficial, e.g. for interactive
use. For example, we could make the language simpler if we forced all string literals to be quoted
and variables unquoted like other programming languages, but that would then require the user
to enter tedious commands in the form of grep ‘searchcontent’ ‘file1’ ‘file2’ ‘file3’,
when the same command without quotes is equivalent. The benefits of the functionality that
caused Shellshock, however, are not so clear to me. That said, Bash is complex software that has
undergone decades of design choices, and I cannot hope to understand all of them. At the same
time, perhaps Shellshock is indicative that Bash has become too complex for any one person to
completely understand, and that this is the optimal time to begin with something new.
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APPENDIX A : COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS
Below is permission for the use of Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2.
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